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This paper highlights some peculiar characteristics of the economic crisis induced by the 
spread of COVID-19. It suggests two intertwined policy measures in order to tackle the 
emergency phase of the crisis and to support the economy in the subsequent recovery phase. 
The proposed short-term policy measures offer policy responses in the event of a second 
wave of coronavirus infections in the coming months. In the aftermath of the emergency 
phase, the current proposal puts forward the implementation of a massive EU-wide recovery 
plan addressing the long-lasting technological and environmental challenges of these years, 
which will be fi nanced by European institutions through the issuance of European Pandemic 
Recovery Bonds.
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The spread of COVID-19 has initiated major changes 
in governments’ and central banks’ policies. There is 
consensus among economists that the governments in 
Europe and in the US, i.e. the current epicentres of the 
pandemic, will have to take extraordinary measures in 
order to deal with the disruptive economic consequenc-
es of the coronavirus crisis. The overwhelming pressure 
on healthcare systems and the forced halt of economic 
activities require massive urgent emergency action to 
tame the immediate consequences of the crisis. Follow-
ing the emergency phase, governments will need to im-
plement further interventions in order to “prevent a re-
cession morphing into a prolonged depression” (Draghi, 
2020).
Bold government interventions might imply a consider-
able increase in public debt. However, fi nancial concerns 
should not limit governments’ actions as the cost of hesi-
tation may be dramatic both in terms of present and fu-
ture social well-being. Concerns over the implications for 
the European public balance sheets may be justifi ed, but 
they completely vanish in the face of the major damag-
es that may be incurred by the European real economy. 
Sound public fi nance ultimately depends on a robust real 
economy.
In this paper, we fi rst recommend a strong emergency 
response in which eurozone governments would cover 
operative costs of companies (small and medium fi rms 
in particular) and guarantee income fl ows to house-
holds in the context of a ‘suspended’ economy. In other 
words, “[t]he job is maintaining the economy on life sup-
port during a period of an artifi cially induced coma while 
we address the public health challenge” (Tooze, 2020). 
We then suggest the implementation of an EU-wide re-
covery plan based on public investment and addressing 
the not-to-be-forgotten climate crisis and the now well 
understood needs of our healthcare systems. We pro-
pose that these interventions be fi nanced by two sets of 
bonds:
• bonds issued by the national governments to cover 
emergency costs, to be fully monetised and sub-
sequently written off by the European Central Bank 
(ECB), in order to prevent any emergency-related in-
crease in public debt stocks;
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• recovery bonds to be issued by European institutions 
to relaunch the European economy in the immediate 
aftermath of the health crisis.
The fi rst point is indispensable, urgent and might perhaps 
help to overcome the existing contrast among eurozone 
governments (even though it implies other types of insti-
tutional changes). The second is equally relevant, and in-
deed much needed, even regardless of the current crisis, 
though there is a little more time for discussion.
Three crucial aspects of the COVID-19 economic 
shock
First, there is no doubt that the COVID-19 economic 
shock is a truly exogenous one. It does not depend on the 
will or previous misbehaviour of any government or pri-
vate sector. This is a signifi cant difference with respect to 
the frequently cited 2007-08 fi nancial crisis. Indeed, the 
outbreak of this crisis was due to new practices in the fi -
nancial sector, e.g. the emergence of so-called ‘shadow 
banking’, which was in turn closely connected to long-
term developments in advanced economies, rising in-
equality fi rst and foremost (Botta et al., 2019). European 
economies were initially affected by the worldwide fi nan-
cial meltdown because European banks were actively 
engaged in the diffusion of ‘toxic’ new fi nancial products 
or supported unsustainable processes such as housing 
bubbles in Ireland, Spain and Greece. That crisis then 
morphed into the eurozone sovereign debt crisis due to 
(external) imbalances among eurozone countries, endog-
enously built-up in the initial phase of monetary integra-
tion (1999-2007), and the institutional defi ciencies in mon-
etary and, especially, fi scal policy (i.e. the pro-cyclicality 
of austerity measures during recessionary phases).
Second, the COVID-19 economic shock stands out as a 
common shock affecting all eurozone countries. While the 
timing and the size of the shock may slightly differ from 
country to country, there is little doubt that all of the euro-
zone economies will experience a recession.
Third, the economic crisis that Europe faces consists of a 
complex mix of supply and demand shocks. On the sup-
ply side, the restrictive measures taken by governments 
in order to implement social distancing and contain the 
spread of the virus have stopped or decreased produc-
tion. Restrictions on mobility and fi rms’ functionality have 
simultaneously induced a tremendous drop in aggregate 
demand. If there is something that European policymak-
ers should have learned from the global and the euro-
zone crises, it is that the recovery is much slower with no 
management of aggregate demand. The acute contrac-
tion in aggregate demand may well explain why infl ation 
spikes due to supply constraints do not represent a seri-
ous threat at the moment; instead, even more worrisome 
defl ationary trends appear more likely (De Grauwe, 2020).
A brief look at some existing proposals
There is a growing debate among economists about the 
most appropriate monetary and fi scal measures for tack-
ling such an extraordinary situation. Some of these have 
been already announced by national governments, the 
European Commission and the ECB.
A fi rst proposal comes from previous ECB president 
Mario Draghi (2020), who emphasises the importance of 
fi nancial institutions accommodating all credit requests 
from the private business sector in order to avoid fi rms’ 
bankruptcies and reductions in the employment level. In 
this sense, Draghi (and many others, e.g. Bénassy-Quéré 
et al. 2020) welcome the ECB’s recent decision to extend 
long-term refi nancing operations, to expand quantitative 
easing (which may help large corporations to issue cor-
porate bonds at a cheap rate), to reduce the main refi -
nancing rate for banks to below zero (de facto subsidising 
their activity) and to temporarily slacken banks’ capital 
requirements. In their view, all these measures may help 
banks to expand lending as much as possible and at very 
low interest rates, possibly close to zero. Nevertheless, 
governments might have to intervene by compensating 
borrowers and de facto bailing out private companies by 
moving private liabilities to an expanding public balance 
sheet. Together, with extraordinary measures already 
taken in order to support healthcare systems, this will 
obviously imply that “much higher public debt levels will 
become a permanent feature of our economies and will 
be accompanied by private debt cancellation” (Draghi, 
2020).
Economists all agree that governments should massive-
ly intervene via public expenditures; consequently, EU 
member states temporarily suspended the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP). Their views, however, diverge when 
it comes to the fi nancing of much larger fi scal defi cits of 
eurozone countries.
The ECB has already taken a fundamental step in the 
right direction by creating the Pandemic Emergency 
Purchase Programme (PEPP). This adds €780 billion to 
existing quantitative easing and makes the issuance of 
new public bonds easier and cheaper on fi nancial mar-
kets (overcoming the 33% limit on a single country’s bond 
share, based on the capital key with some deviations). 
Given such a favourable monetary context, some econo-
mists think that the creation of long-term (50, 100 years 
or even perpetual) eurobonds issued by single member 
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countries but jointly guaranteed by the tax capacity of the 
eurozone as a whole would be the best solution (Giavazzi 
and Tabellini, 2020; Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2020). Alter-
natively, the expanded asset purchasing programme re-
cently announced by the ECB could represent the proper 
framework for the introduction of a ‘European safe asset’ 
possibly issued by a European institution (the European 
Commission, for example) rather than by national govern-
ments, and backed by a centralised taxation scheme, i.e. 
revenues from a newly created European tax or compul-
sory transfers from member states to the centre (Codog-
no and van den Noord, 2020). One reason for such cen-
tralised eurobonds,1 among many others, should be the 
creation of fi scal space for stabilisation policies in times 
of major crises.
In a similar vein, the European Commission has an-
nounced the creation of SURE, a EU-level fi nancial 
scheme supporting member states in the emergency 
provision of short-term work schemes such as Cassa In-
tegrazione Guadagni in Italy and Kurzarbeit in Germany. 
Indeed, the main goal of SURE is to reduce EU member 
states single-country reliance on fi nancial markets by 
partially replacing potentially costlier new issuances of 
national bonds with cheaper temporary loans provided 
by the European Commission, and in turn fi nanced by the 
introduction of a common European AAA-rated asset.
The above proposals share a common aspect: They all 
foresee emergency plans grounded in the functioning 
of fi nancial markets. While market mechanisms are sus-
pended and cannot work for most of the real economy, 
its fi nancial needs should still remain satisfi ed by the ‘nor-
mal’ provision of credit from fi nancial institutions. This as-
pect is not trivial. In fact, it implies that at the end of the 
emergency phase, private companies and/or the public 
sector might face a higher stock of debt, albeit at reduced 
or no (interest) cost. And this may in turn weaken the ef-
fectiveness of recovery measures implemented in the 
post-pandemic period in fragile economies overburdened 
by newly created emergency-related debt.
While frequently treated separately, the emergency and 
post-pandemic phases of the current crisis are closely 
connected. Galì (2020) recognises this fact and suggests 
an alternative that relies on so-called helicopter money. 
This may take the form of either direct money transfers 
from central banks’ accounts to citizens’ bank accounts, 
generally referred to as ‘direct cash handouts’, or by 
1 Codogno and van den Noord (2020) also propose that centralised eu-
robonds should replace national bonds in the balance sheets of fi nan-
cial institutions in their role as collaterals with seniority in refi nancing 
operations with the ECB and in inter-bank transactions.
‘monetary fi nancing’ of government expenditures by pro-
viding governments with grants. This has the advantage 
of central banks creating all the needed resources to deal 
with the emergency but not creating extra debt.
An integrated policy package for the emergency and 
economic recovery
Our proposal addresses both the emergency and post-
pandemic phases of the coronavirus crisis. The acute 
phase of the COVID-19 pandemic seems to be over in 
most European countries. Accordingly, they have lifted 
the most stringent lockdown measures implemented 
in March and April. The short-term policy measures de-
scribed below can thus be interpreted as potential policy 
responses should a second wave of coronavirus infec-
tions occur in the coming months.
Short-term actions to sustain the ‘suspended’ economy 
In the event of a second wave of COVID-19 and a new 
lockdown, eurozone governments should step in to se-
cure the incomes of a large part of the private sector. The 
idea is to accept that the normal functioning of eurozone 
economies might be de facto suspended again. While 
continuing to remunerate public servants, all businesses 
requiring support should receive government assistance 
covering around 70-80% of their labour costs (up to a pre-
determined ceiling) and the full amount of their fi xed costs 
according to recent administrative/fi scal data. This should 
be done in favour of all businesses forced to close and of 
those that are still active but experiencing a major reduc-
tion in demand. Different types of support can be linked 
to different types of conditionalities, such as a no-layoff 
clause for employees benefi tting from temporary employ-
ment protection schemes, or workers’ involvement in the 
co-direction of companies benefi tting from temporary 
equity from the public sector. Government expenditure 
should replace lacking demand during possible future 
emergency periods. Government transfers should also 
be directed towards self-employed and freelance workers 
unable to work in a new lockdown. Extra compensation 
should be remunerated to active workers employed in vital 
sectors, from hospitals to food, energy, communications, 
etc.
Financing the emergency spending
Our proposal is in line with the idea of governments as 
the ‘buyers of last resort’ (see Saez and Zucman, 2020). 
Differently from Saez and Zucman (2020), however, we 
stress that the fi nancing of these measures should come 
from the ECB and not from a tax increase, even not for the 
wealthiest. Even though more progressive taxation would 
Intereconomics 2020 | 4
242
Coronavirus Crisis
be highly desirable across Europe, the risk of a recessive 
effect must be avoided during emergency phases.
Specifi cally, we foresee a scheme according to which 
emergency spending by eurozone governments should 
be certifi ed by the European Commission based on 
shared rules. Such certifi cation from the EU Commission 
can effectively replace ‘weak’ conditionality associated 
with the emergency credit line from the ESM. Govern-
ments should then fi nance their crisis response by issu-
ing public bonds that the ECB directly purchases on the 
primary market (see De Grauwe, 2020) and subsequently 
writes off from its own balance sheet. In doing so, the ECB 
will de facto make a transfer to the accounts of eurozone 
governments in order to provide them with the resources 
needed to tackle the current economic emergency (see 
Galì, 2020). This way, it will avert further increases in pub-
lic debt stocks that could restrain governments’ efforts to 
boost economic recovery.
The implementation of this fi nancing scheme would cer-
tainly represent a violation of the ECB statute. If such an 
economic taboo cannot be challenged openly, it should 
be addressed implicitly. The ECB’s purchases of govern-
ment bonds on primary markets could take place indi-
rectly via the creation of a public special purpose vehicle. 
This fi nancial institution would buy bonds from govern-
ments on the primary market, and indirectly pass them to 
the ECB by issuing liabilities that the ECB itself can pur-
chase in the context of ECB quantitative easing. Eventu-
ally, when public bonds issued during the crisis mature, 
they should be automatically rolled over (effectively be-
coming consols, i.e. perpetual, non-redeemable bonds) 
and, in any case, they should never be included in the 
computation of the debt-to-GDP ratios.
It is worth mentioning that such a proposal overcomes the 
political problem of the mutualisation of public debt. And 
it certainly implies no less challenging temporary amend-
ments in the relationship between the ECB and national 
governments. Nonetheless, the close cooperation be-
tween governments and the ECB is vital for keeping the 
eurozone economy going and for avoiding fi nancial spec-
ulations during possible future lockdown periods.
Relaunching the economy in the aftermath of the 
emergency
When the situation allows for a gradual return to social life 
and for a restart of the private sector, European institu-
tions should take a second step to support the recovery 
of the eurozone (one that was already needed even before 
the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic). A large-scale 
plan for fi nancing physical and digital infrastructures, 
healthcare and scientifi c research, energy-saving and 
clean technologies along an ecological transition is need-
ed. Emergency fi nancing should not come at the expense 
of the other fi nancial and developmental programmes of 
the EU, particularly the European Green Deal, the Euro-
pean Social Fund, the European Investment Fund, Ho-
rizon Europe and other cohesion funds. Rather, those 
programmes should be used to reignite the economy in a 
timely fashion.
In the case of the eurozone, the COVID-19 crisis is hitting 
a limping economic system, lagging behind in the evolu-
tion of key sectors (e.g. the automotive sector) and char-
acterised by very low levels of public investment.2 At the 
global level, the pandemic is taking place in the midst of 
an ecological crisis. The goal of a European recovery plan 
should thus not be limited to jumpstarting economic ac-
tivity, but rather should guide the economy of the EU, and 
of the eurozone in particular, towards a more sustainable, 
technologically advanced and inclusive socio-economic 
system.
On the one hand, public investment may represent an im-
portant contribution to euro area aggregate demand. The 
countercyclical aspect of this plan is fundamental in or-
der to support solid recovery in the profi tability of private 
business and prompt a strong economic rebound. On the 
other hand, given its exceptional character, such a recov-
ery plan should shape the long-run development path 
of the European economy by supporting public invest-
ment (e.g. infrastructure) at the European level, as well as 
country-specifi c actions in selected strategic areas (e.g. 
improvements in the healthcare systems or the decar-
bonisation of European economies). Time is a crucial ele-
ment. A major investment plan needs to be implemented 
as soon as the health emergency ends. The later EU in-
stitutions and national governments intervene to reignite 
the private sector’s confi dence and to counteract the self-
reinforcing vicious circle of low demand and production, 
the harder it will be for the whole European economy to 
recover.
Financing the relaunch of the economy
In order to emphasise its EU-wide nature, the recovery 
plan outlined in the previous section should be imple-
mented and fi nanced by recovery bonds, let us call them 
European Pandemic Recovery Bonds (EPRBs). EPRBs 
2 See Della Posta et al. (2019) for an analysis of investment defi ciencies 
in Europe and the necessity – after the two recessions of 2008-09 and 
2012-13 (and even more now, we might add) – of a grand European 
investment plan that, among other things, could help in restoring a 
pro-European sentiment (after fi scal austerity and the consequent 
dreadful social conditions).
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differ from public bonds issued in the crisis because they 
aim at fi nancing the medium- to long-term recovery of the 
European economy by supporting the technological up-
grade and ecological reconversion of its production sys-
tem. EPRBs could be issued by different European insti-
tutions. One option entails the European Investment Bank 
(EIB) being entitled to issue European recovery bonds. 
While this option might be the quickest and easiest one 
to implement as it may imply relatively minor institutional 
changes, it still requires that the EIB is recapitalised by 
member states in order to allow it to fi nance a massive 
pan-European investment plan. Alternatively, the Euro-
pean Commission could be responsible for the fi nancial 
support of a more structural and deeper European recov-
ery plan (although this may perhaps be harder for member 
states to agree on in the short term). This will represent a 
fi rst signifi cant step towards the creation of a proper fi scal 
union.
Following Codogno and van den Noord (2020), EPRBs, 
issued by either the EIB and/or the European Commis-
sion, should represent safe assets for fi nancial markets 
eligible for the ECB’s asset purchase programmes. The 
ECB should decide the amount of EPRB-fi nanced expen-
ditures to ultimately cover with money (i.e. by purchasing 
EPRBs itself), and the amount to leave to investors. In this 
sense, the ECB should act by taking into account the fi ne-
tuning of eurozone infl ationary dynamics with respect to 
its own infl ationary target. Nonetheless, the ECB should 
also bear in mind that both the ability to meet fi nancial 
commitments by European fi rms and governments, i.e. 
the fi nancial stability of the euro area, and the value of the 
euro currency ultimately depend on the strength of the 
underlying production system. All concerns for ECB mon-
etary fi nancing should thus pale in comparison with the 
urgency to preserve and re-launch the European produc-
tion system.
Economic concerns may arise from the monetisation of 
public expenditures. Infl ation is not directly linked to the 
amount of money issued by the central bank, and no 
major concerns for infl ation seem plausible today. None-
theless, it is important to remember that the present cri-
sis, unlike the Great Recession of 2009, involves some 
aspects of a potentially relevant supply shock so that, if 
fought only via demand-side policies (regardless of the 
fi nancing), undesired levels of infl ation may occur. It is 
precisely for this reason that it is of vital importance to in-
tervene to preserve and relaunch the production potential 
of the European real economy sector. The much-needed 
countercyclical fi scal policy should therefore not be lim-
ited to relaunching aggregate demand. Still, it is also 
important to keep in mind that a higher level of infl ation 
than what we have been witnessing in recent years will be 
desirable to lower the burden of the debt inherited from 
the crisis. All in all, public spending during the crisis and 
during the recovery would prevent a further drop in GDP, 
thereby averting an even greater surge in the public debt-
to-GDP ratio. Moreover, a European plan to boost the re-
covery after the crisis based on investments would play 
a benefi cial role both on the demand side, by increasing 
aggregate demand that may give rise to an infl ationary 
pressure as time elapses, and the supply side, by enlarg-
ing the productive base that instead would contribute to 
keeping infl ation under control.
An outlook on the future of the eurozone
The project of building a European Union with common 
markets and institutions has proceeded in alternate phas-
es of great diffi culties and great progress in the course 
of European integration. While fi scal policy has remained 
anchored to national decisions and inter-governmental 
coordination due to the overly timid political climate and 
the obsession with moral hazard, monetary policy under 
ECB president Draghi greatly changed in order to re-
spond more effectively to the long-lasting consequences 
of the 2007-08 fi nancial crisis and to the specifi c prob-
lems within the eurozone. An additional step is urgently 
needed. Fiscal and monetary policy must evolve jointly 
at the European level. It is not the time for self-imposed 
restrictions on the spending capacity of the public sec-
tor. It is time to abandon dogmas and fl awed economic 
theories on the functioning of monetary systems. With the 
likely collapse of aggregate demand in the eurozone as a 
consequence of the fi ght against the spread of the coro-
navirus, a new expansion of the ECB’s balance sheet to 
create money is needed, this time to be used in the real 
economy sector. This monetary expansion will hardly 
have any signifi cant infl ationary impact.3 And if this were 
not the case, a (modest) increase in price dynamics might 
actually make the higher debt burden inherited from this 
crisis more sustainable.
The temporary suspension of the SGP in the midst of the 
current health and economic emergency is certainly a 
positive development. Nonetheless, the ongoing discus-
sions among member states seem to suggest that once 
the emergency phase is over, pro-austerity countries will 
push for reintroducing tough fi scal rules and austerity 
3 According to Blanchard (2020), a very unlikely sustained increase 
in infl ation in the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis might be due to a 
combination of three factors: a very large increase in the debt-to-GDP 
ratio, larger than the 20-30% or so under current forecasts; a very 
large increase in the neutral rate, that is the safe real rate needed to 
keep the economy at potential; perhaps most important, fi scal domi-
nance of monetary policy. Overall, we should be more worried about 
defl ation than infl ation.
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plans, reiterating the sad story we already saw in the re-
cent past. If we consider that a huge contraction in GDP 
and a strong increase in government spending jointly 
contribute to a massive surge in public debt-to-GDP ratio, 
it becomes clear that the application of SGP – or fi scal 
compact-inspired fi scal discipline is untenable. We sug-
gest the following alternatives (in ascending order of ef-
fectiveness):
1. The crisis-led debt accumulated during the pandem-
ic does not account for the application of fi scal rules 
once the crisis is over.
2. Bonds issued by national governments during the cri-
sis are fully monetised by the ECB, i.e. they are can-
celled or forgiven at maturity.
3. The ECB acts directly as a buyer of last resort, bypass-
ing governments, thus implementing the operations 
already described above. This helicopter money is 
calibrated on the need to replace the private economy 
during the suspension of market activities during the 
health crisis.
In the long run, European institutions, and eurozone gov-
ernments in particular, need to be aware that changes are 
unavoidable, as the current crisis renders fi scal rules and 
existing treaties outdated and inapplicable. Such long-
run structural changes should not be the disorganised 
results of concessions, but the fruits of a vision for the 
recovery and development of the economy of the EU as a 
whole, and of the eurozone in particular. It is time for the 
eurozone to act as a union. If this is not the case even in 
the face of such a dramatic crisis and its aftermath, the 
very existence of the EU will be called into question. In a 
way, the current COVID-19 emergency may be the last call 
to make signifi cant steps towards a proper political union.
If even under exceptional conditions disagreements 
among member states persist regarding the need to act 
jointly against a huge symmetric shock (with asymmetric 
impact), then single countries will eventually have to mon-
etise crisis debts by themselves. It goes without saying 
that this will imply leaving the euro and returning to na-
tional central banks, or perhaps moving towards a smaller 
aggregation of countries agreeing on a deeper sharing of 
monetary and fi scal policies in a renewed and more co-
operative Europe. This might be the case of a Mediterra-
nean European monetary area, perhaps putting together 
France, Italy and Spain, arising with its own currency, a 
common fi scal policy and a fully operational central bank. 
Needless to say, this is a very different type of Europe, 
and of Economic and Monetary Union, than was originally 
intended by the noble fathers of European integration.
This is why, in the midst of a tremendous health and eco-
nomic crisis, we need more than ever full access to all 
possible joint fi scal and monetary tools. The suspension 
of the SGP and the instruments proposed in the European 
Council on April 23rd, as well as the expanding operabil-
ity of the ECB through PEPP and other measures, give us 
hope that something is moving in Europe. But, especially 
for fi scal policy, this is an overly timid step forward. The 
current discussion among EU member states about the 
EU recovery fund might represent a promising develop-
ment towards the creation of a much-needed fi scal space 
at the EU level supporting an investment-led recovery of 
the European economy.
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